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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN INDIANA
At the first meeting of the Supreme Court, in open session, after
the present constitution of the State of Indiana had gone into force, in
open court a motion was made for the admission of a candidate for
admission as a lawyer and the objection was at once made that he had
not been examined concerning his legal qualifications as a lawyer.
From 1805 until then all candidates for admission had had to pass an
examination concerning their attainments in the knowledge of the law
before admission.
The court at once, sitting on the bench in open session, held a con-
ference, and the Chief Justice announced in open court that under the
present constitution, it was no longer necessary to examine an appli-
cant for admission to practice in the courts concerning his legal attain-
ments in the law and legal qualifications as a lawyer and the appli-
cant was at once admitted.
That was the first interpretation of the clause, "Every person of
good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to
practice law in all courts of justice," by our Supreme Court; and it
has maintained that interpretation ever since, except when it went
off on a tangent and decided that a woman (before she became a
voter) could be admitted to practice in our courts-a freak decision
for which no lawyer of sound legal ability has any respect.
That was an intepretation of the plain and unambiguous language
of the constitution, which has been acquiesced in for seventy-five
years, and which interpretation has been acquiesced in by the bench
and bar of this state for three quarters of a century.
The phrase, "good moral character," then had a definite meaning,
and it has the same definite meaning now; in it there has been no
change; no one can enlarge the meaning and no one can belittle
it. Where the language of a statute or a constitution is plain and
unambiguous there is no ground for construction; its plain meaning
must be accepted. If the rule be not followed, we will have chaos in
our laws.
The recent theory put forth that a man who applies for admis-
sion to practice when he has no knowledge of the principles and prac-
tice of the law is not a "moral" man is pernicious and is born of an
ever growing desire to require all applicants to pass an examination
touching this legal qualification to practice and if adopted will result
in a clear violation of the constitution.
I say all this, notwithstanding I think an examination of appli-
cants concerning their legal attainments is a most desirabe thing; but
I cannot acquiesce in the effort to place upon its constitutional phrase
"good mora character" an interpetation not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. This is an instance where the means does not justify
the end.
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What excuse can we lawyers give the public that we are willing
to violate the constitution to reach a desired result? If we set the
example before the public, what can we say of the public when it
demands a violation of the constitution to reach a result it desires to
attain ?
W. W. THomoN
Of the Indianapois Bar.
